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Adoption of Phosphorus-free Lawn Fertilizer Laws in the U.S

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  • Lee, Seungyub
  • McCann, Laura M.

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  • Lee, Seungyub & McCann, Laura M., 2017. "Adoption of Phosphorus-free Lawn Fertilizer Laws in the U.S," 2017 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 1, Chicago, Illinois 258207, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea17:258207
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.258207
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, 1981. "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in Public Regulation, pages 1-78, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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