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The Economics Of Intellectual Property Rights Under Imperfect Enforcement

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  • Giannakas, Konstantinos

Abstract

The introduction of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is one of the most notable features of agricultural biotechnology. So are growing concerns about the widespread violation of IPRs in developing countries. This paper develops a model of heterogeneous producers to examine the economic causes of IPR infringement and its consequences for the welfare of the interest groups and the pricing and adoption of a new technology (i.e., a genetically modified seed) in the context of a small open developing economy. Enforcement of IPRs, and pricing and adoption of the new technology are modeled as a sequential game between the government that enforces the IPRs, a foreign innovating firm that prices the new technology, and the developing country's producers who make the production and cheating decisions. Analytical results show that producer compliance with the provisions of IPRs is not the natural outcome of self-interest and complete deterrence of IPR infringement is not always economically optimal. IPR infringement affects the welfare of the interest groups and has important ramifications for the pricing and adoption of the new technology. The quantitative nature of the results depends critically on the existing labeling regime. The analysis also shows that differences in the level of IPR enforcement provide an alternative justification for (and explanation of) differences in the pricing of the new technology in different countries around the world - a strategy adopted by leading innovators in the sector. Finally, the results suggest that if the penalties for IPR infringement under the TRIPs agreement follow the custom of retaliatory sanctions under the GATT, enforcement of IPRs will remain imperfect and the innovators' ability to obtain value for their biotech traits will still be limited.

Suggested Citation

  • Giannakas, Konstantinos, 2001. "The Economics Of Intellectual Property Rights Under Imperfect Enforcement," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20584, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea01:20584
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    File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20584
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    Cited by:

    1. Gaisford, James D., 2002. "Agricultural Biotechnology and the FTAA: Issues and Opportunities," Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, Estey Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade, vol. 3(2).
    2. Maxwell, Brett J. & Wilson, William W. & Dahl, Bruce L., 2004. "Marketing Mechanisms In Gm Grains And Oilseeds," Agribusiness & Applied Economics Report 23639, North Dakota State University, Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics.

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