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Third Down with a Yard to Go: The Dixit-Skeath Conundrum on Equilibria in Competitive Games

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  • Grant, S.
  • Kajii, A.
  • Polak, B.

Abstract

In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop the reduction axiom.

Suggested Citation

  • Grant, S. & Kajii, A. & Polak, B., 1999. "Third Down with a Yard to Go: The Dixit-Skeath Conundrum on Equilibria in Competitive Games," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 1999-375, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:acb:cbeeco:1999-375
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    File URL: https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/econ/wp375.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi & Polak, Ben, 1998. "Intrinsic Preference for Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 233-259, December.
    2. Kreps, David M & Porteus, Evan L, 1978. "Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 185-200, January.
    3. Gollier Christian, 1995. "The Comparative Statics of Changes in Risk Revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 522-535, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    GAME THEORY ; COMPETITION ; EXPECTATIONS;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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