Introduction to When Insurers Go Bust: An Economic Analysis of the Role and Design of Prudential Regulation
In: When Insurers Go Bust: An Economic Analysis of the Role and Design of Prudential Regulation
Download full text from publisher
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- René Doff, 2016. "The Final Solvency II Framework: Will It Be Effective?," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 41(4), pages 587-607, October.
- Thimann, Christian, 2014.
"How insurers differ from banks: a primer on systemic regulation,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
61218, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Christian Thimann, 2014. "How Insurers Differ from Banks: A Primer on Systemic Regulation," PSE Working Papers halshs-01074933, HAL.
- John Marshall, 2009. "Review of Guillaume Plantin and Jean-Charles Rochet, When Insurers Go Bust: An Economic Analysis of the Role and Design of Prudential Regulation," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 139-146.
- Antonio Zanella, 2011. "Solvency II and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis: The Case of Misplaced Prudence," Chapters,in: Institutions in Crisis, chapter 6 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Bank for International Settlements, 2011. "Fixed income strategies of insurance companies and pension funds," CGFS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 44.
- Christian Thimann, 2014. "How Insurers Differ from Banks: A Primer on Systemic Regulation," Working Papers halshs-01074933, HAL.
- Thorsten V. Koeppl & James MacGee, 2007. "Branching Out: The Urgent Need to Transform Canada’s Financial Landscape and How to Do It," C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, C.D. Howe Institute, issue 251, June.
- Alessandro Fiori Maccioni, 2011. "A Stochastic Model for the Analysis of Demographic Risk in Pay-As-You-Go Pension Funds," Papers 1106.5081, arXiv.org.
- Kirti, Divya, 2018. "When gambling for resurrection is too risky," ESRB Working Paper Series 69, European Systemic Risk Board.
More about this item
Keywordsinsurance; regulation; supervision; solvency; claimholders; finance theory; theory of organizations; authorities; incentives;
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pup:chapts:8440-1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Webmaster). General contact details of provider: http://press.princeton.edu .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.