Fixing the Patent Office
In: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 13
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- Marc Baudry & Béatrice Dumont, 2006.
"Patent Renewals as Options: Improving the Mechanism for Weeding Out Lousy Patents,"
Review of Industrial Organization,
Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 41-62, 02.
- Marc Baudry & Béatrice Dumont, 2006. "Patent renewals as options : improving the mechanism for weeding out lousy patents," Post-Print halshs-00009909, HAL.
- James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, 2008.
"Introduction to Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk
[Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk]," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
- Catherine Tucker, 2012. "Patent Trolls and Technology Diffusion," NBER Chapters, in: Standards, Patents and Innovations National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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