Banking Concentration: Implications for Systemic Risk and Safety-net Design
In: Banking Market Structure and Monetary Policy
No abstract is available for this item.
|This chapter was published in: Luis Antonio Ahumada & J. Rodrigo Fuentes & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series Editor) (ed.) Banking Market Structure and Monetary Policy, , chapter 13, pages 359-385, 2004.|
|This item is provided by Central Bank of Chile in its series Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series with number v07c13pp359-385.|
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- Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The prudential regulation of banks," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9539, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000.
"Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
- Rochet, Jean-Charles & Tirole, Jean, 1996.
"Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(4), pages 733-62, November.
- James, Christopher, 1991. " The Losses Realized in Bank Failures," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1223-42, September.
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