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Anat Lerner

Personal Details

First Name:Anat
Middle Name:
Last Name:Lerner
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:ple202

Affiliation

Department of Management and Economics
Open University

Israel
http://www-e.openu.ac.il/academic/dept341.html

: 972-9-7781889
972-9-7780668

RePEc:edi:ecopuil (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 1997. "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Game Theory and Information 9707010, EconWPA, revised 01 Apr 1998.
  2. ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997. "Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents," CORE Discussion Papers 1997077, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

Articles

  1. Anat Lerner & Rica Gonen, 2014. "Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 5(2), pages 1-19, April.
  2. Rica Gonen & Anat Lerner, 2014. "Two-Outcome dictatorial mechanisms in constrained combinatorial auctions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(2), pages 810-818.
  3. Lerner Anat & Gonen Rica, 2013. "Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-18, June.
  4. Rica Gonen & Anat Lerner, 2013. "The Incompatibility of Pareto Optimality and Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility in Sufficiently-Anonymous Budget-Constrained Quasilinear Settings," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(4), pages 1-21, November.
  5. Alboth, Dirk & Lerner, Anat & Shalev, Jonathan, 2001. " Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 501-525.
  6. Lerner, Anat, 1998. "A Pie Allocation Among Sharing Groups," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 316-330, February.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 1997. "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Game Theory and Information 9707010, EconWPA, revised 01 Apr 1998.

    Cited by:

    1. Barbieri Stefano & Malueg David A., 2010. "Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-31, February.
    2. Zhi Li & Christopher Anderson & Stephen K. Swallow, 2012. "Uniform Price Mechanisms for Threshold Public Goods Provision: An Experimental Investigation," Working Papers 14, University of Connecticut, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Charles J. Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy.
    3. Stefano Barbieri & David A. Malueg, 2008. "Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Continuous-Strategy Equilibria in the Private-Information Subscription Game," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(4), pages 529-545, August.
    4. Pengfei Liu & Stephen K. Swallow & Christopher M. Anderson, 2016. "Threshold-Level Public Goods Provision with Multiple Units: Experimental Effects of Disaggregated Groups with Rebates," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 92(3), pages 515-533.
    5. Barbieri, Stefano & Malueg, David A., 2010. "Threshold uncertainty in the private-information subscription game," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 848-861, December.
    6. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers 5558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Jingfeng Lu & Euston Quah, 2009. "Private Provisions of a Discrete Public Good with Voluntary Participation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(3), pages 343-362, June.
    8. Li, Zhi & Anderson, Christopher M. & Swallow, Stephen K., 2016. "Uniform price mechanisms for threshold public goods provision with complete information: An experimental investigation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 14-26.
    9. Stefano Barbieri & David Malueg, 2008. "Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(1), pages 51-80, October.
    10. Stefano Barbieri & David A. Malueg, 2010. "Increasing Fundraising Success by Decreasing Donor Choice," Working Papers 1006, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
    11. Matthew Ellman & Sjaak Hurkens, 2014. "Optimal Crowdfunding Design," Working Papers 14-21, NET Institute.
    12. Toth, Sandor F. & Rabotyagov, Sergey S. & Ettl, Gregory J., 2009. "Experimental Testbeds for ECOSEL: A Market Framework for Private Provision of Forest Ecosystem Services," 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 49565, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    13. Murat Yilmaz, 2010. "Auctioning a Discrete Public Good under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2010/14, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Anat Lerner & Rica Gonen, 2014. "Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 5(2), pages 1-19, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Anat Lerner & Rica Gonen, 2016. "Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(03), pages 1-10, September.

  2. Lerner Anat & Gonen Rica, 2013. "Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-18, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Rica Gonen & Anat Lerner, 2013. "The Incompatibility of Pareto Optimality and Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility in Sufficiently-Anonymous Budget-Constrained Quasilinear Settings," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(4), pages 1-21, November.
    2. Anat Lerner & Rica Gonen, 2014. "Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 5(2), pages 1-19, April.

  3. Alboth, Dirk & Lerner, Anat & Shalev, Jonathan, 2001. " Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 501-525.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Lerner, Anat, 1998. "A Pie Allocation Among Sharing Groups," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 316-330, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 1997. "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Game Theory and Information 9707010, EconWPA, revised 01 Apr 1998.
    2. Calleja, P. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P., 2001. "Multi-Issue Allocation Games," Discussion Paper 2001-30, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997. "Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents," CORE Discussion Papers 1997077, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Calleja, Pedro & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud, 2005. "Multi-issue allocation situations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 164(3), pages 730-747, August.
    5. Rhee, Sangkyu, 2006. "Allocation problems among sharing groups," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 398-418, February.
    6. Rhee, Sangkyu, 2005. "Sharing-group allocation problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 51-56, January.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 1998-10-02
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 1998-10-02
  3. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (1) 1998-10-02
  4. NEP-PUB: Public Finance (1) 1998-10-02

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