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The role of public-private partnerships in local infrastructure : the case of carbon offset projects

  • Lorenzi, Jean-Hervé
  • Teichmann, Dorothee
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    Investment in low carbon infrastructure is considered an important component of the fight against climate change. The mechanisms of climate regulation (such as carbon offsets) transfer to project developers the risks associated with reducing emissions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, i.e. operational and technological risk, or risks associated with the environmental monitoring and the regulatory mechanism itself. The success of projects depends importantly on the risk sharing arrangements between the private and public partners. It is shown that the delegation of tasks between the partners can create risks that affect the environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency of the project. For a sample of landfill gas flaring projects financed under the Clean Development Mechanism, it is shown that the outsourcing of the provision of technology creates additional risks. The outsourcing of the development of the official project documentation required by the UNFCCC and the separation of the operation of the landfill and the CDM project development appear to be manageable by risk sharing arrangements.

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    File URL: http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/bitstream/123456789/8201/1/12-01-17_Diss_Final_Version_D_TEICHMANN.pdf
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    This book is provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/8201 and published in 2011.
    Order: http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/handle/123456789/8201
    Handle: RePEc:dau:thesis:123456789/8201
    Note: dissertation
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html

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    1. Oliver Hart, 2003. "Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(486), pages C69-C76, March.
    2. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros, 2005. "Public-private partnerships: contract design and risk transfer," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/175947, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, June.
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