IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/zbw/espost/342689.html

Don’t They Know or Don’t They Care?: The Role of Knowledge in Private Disability Insurance Purchase Behavior in Germany

Author

Listed:
  • Kwasniok, Sascha

Abstract

The loss of the ability to work poses substantial financial risks that are often not adequately covered by state benefits. Although private disability insurance (DI) may complement public insurance systems, demand remains comparatively moderate in many countries. Using Germany as an empirical setting, this study examines behavioral factors associated with private DI purchase intentions and purchase behavior. An exploratory sequential mixed methods design is employed. First, semi-structured interviews with financial advisors are conducted to assess the practical relevance of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and to identify additional salient factors for DI demand emerging from advisory practice. Building on these insights, the study develops a two-layered research model in which TPB serves as a behavioral foundation and qualitative findings inform model extensions. Second, the resulting model is tested using survey data from 323 consumers through partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) and importance-performance map analysis (IPMA). The results confirm the suitability of TPB for explaining private DI demand. Beyond this behavioral baseline, perceived product benefits and risks shape attitudes toward private DI. Furthermore, DI knowledge emerges as an important product-specific dimension of insurance literacy that influences perceived product benefits, perceived product risks, and perceived behavioral control. The study contributes to the literature on insurance demand behavior by integrating DI-specific evaluative and knowledge-related mechanisms into a TPB framework. Furthermore, the findings provide practical implications for improving insurance literacy and supporting informed and needs-appropriate decisions regarding protection against disability-related income loss.

Suggested Citation

  • Kwasniok, Sascha, 2026. "Don’t They Know or Don’t They Care?: The Role of Knowledge in Private Disability Insurance Purchase Behavior in Germany," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 34(2), pages 1-25.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:342689
    DOI: 10.61190/nzx8vx70
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/342689/1/Kwasniok-Dont-They-Know.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.61190/nzx8vx70?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Autor & Mark Duggan & Jonathan Gruber, 2014. "Moral Hazard and Claims Deterrence in Private Disability Insurance," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 110-141, October.
    2. de Jonge, Patricia & Ungureanu, Olga & Zeelenberg, Marcel & Verlegh, Peeter W. J., 2024. "The acceptability of behavioural interventions in financial decision-making," Behavioural Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(4), pages 759-772, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fevang, Elisabeth & Hardoy, Inés & Røed, Knut, 2013. "Getting Disabled Workers Back to Work: How Important Are Economic Incentives?," IZA Discussion Papers 7137, IZA Network @ LISER.
    2. Bíró, Anikó & Elek, Péter, 2020. "Job loss, disability insurance and health expenditure," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    3. David C. Stapleton & Yonatan Ben-Shalom & David R. Mann, "undated". "The Employment/Eligibility Service System: A New Gateway for Employment Supports and Social Security Disability Benefits," Mathematica Policy Research Reports d8835946ad2743028b4b7acfc, Mathematica Policy Research.
    4. Johannes S. Kunz & Kevin E. Staub & Rainer Winkelmann, 2021. "Predicting individual effects in fixed effects panel probit models," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 184(3), pages 1109-1145, July.
    5. Lavy, Victor & Rachkovski, Genia & Yoresh, Omry, 2025. "Heads up: Does air pollution cause workplace accidents?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 251(C).
    6. Matthew J. Hill & Jose I. Silva & Judit Vall Castello, 2019. "Act now: The effects of the 2008 Spanish disability reform," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(7), pages 906-920, July.
    7. Sebastian Soika, 2018. "Moral Hazard and Advantageous Selection in Private Disability Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 43(1), pages 97-125, January.
    8. Yaming Cao & Björn Fischer-Weckemann & Johannes Geyer & Nicolas Ziebarth, 2026. "Fundamentally Reforming the DI System: Evidence from Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 2157, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    9. Hassink, Wolter & Koning, Pierre & Zwinkels, Wim, 2015. "Employers Opting Out of Public Disability Insurance: Selection or Incentive Effects?," IZA Discussion Papers 9181, IZA Network @ LISER.
    10. Koning, Pierre & Prudon, Roger, 2025. "Sick or Unemployed? Examining Transitions into Sickness Insurance at Unemployment Benefit Exhaustion," IZA Discussion Papers 18264, IZA Network @ LISER.
    11. Jessica H. Brown, 2022. "The tradeoff between knowledge of mandated benefits and moral hazard," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(3), pages 1037-1064, January.
    12. Cecilia Machado & Valdemar Neto & Christiane Szerman, 2023. "Firm and Worker Responses to Extensions in Paid Maternity Leave," CESifo Working Paper Series 10736, CESifo.
    13. Pichler, Stefan & Ziebarth, Nicolas R., 2024. "Sick leave and medical leave in the United States: A categorization and recent trends," ZEW Discussion Papers 24-011, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    14. Arthur Seibold & Sebastian Seitz & Sebastian Siegloch, 2025. "Privatizing Disability Insurance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 93(5), pages 1697-1737, September.
    15. Hamish Low & Luigi Pistaferri, 2020. "Disability Insurance: Theoretical Trade‐Offs and Empirical Evidence," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(1), pages 129-164, March.
    16. David Autor & Andreas Kostøl & Magne Mogstad & Bradley Setzler, 2019. "Disability Benefits, Consumption Insurance, and Household Labor Supply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(7), pages 2613-2654, July.
    17. Christos I. Giannikos & Andreas Kakolyris & Tin Shan Suen, 2025. "Risk attitudes and private disability insurance holdings," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 49(1), pages 23-44, March.
    18. Ahammer, Alexander & Packham, Analisa, 2025. "Disability insurance screening and worker health," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    19. Julian Jäger & Elisabeth Sattler-Bublitz & Miriam Beblo, 2025. "Disabling misperceptions? How employees (D)evaluate the labor force participation of people with disabilities," Journal for Labour Market Research, Springer;Institute for Employment Research/ Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), vol. 59(1), pages 1-15, December.
    20. Mathilde Godard & Maarten Lindeboom & Pierre Koning, 2018. "Targeting disability insurance applications with screening," Post-Print halshs-01960488, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance
    • G52 - Financial Economics - - Household Finance - - - Insurance
    • G53 - Financial Economics - - Household Finance - - - Financial Literacy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:342689. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/zbwkide.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.