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Warum überleben Diktaturen?

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  • Gerschewski, Johannes
  • Merkel, Wolfgang
  • Schmotz, Alexander
  • Stefes, Christoph H.
  • Tanneberg, Dag

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  • Gerschewski, Johannes & Merkel, Wolfgang & Schmotz, Alexander & Stefes, Christoph H. & Tanneberg, Dag, 2013. "Warum überleben Diktaturen?," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 0, pages 106-131.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:226172
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Greif, Avner & Laitin, David D., 2004. "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 633-652, November.
    2. Wintrobe,Ronald, 2000. "The Political Economy of Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521794497, October.
    3. Milan W. Svolik, 2009. "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(2), pages 477-494, April.
    4. Gandhi,Jennifer, 2008. "Political Institutions under Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521897952, October.
    5. Bertocchi, Graziella & Spagat, Michael, 2004. "The evolution of modern educational systems: Technical vs. general education, distributional conflict, and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 559-582, April.
    6. Ellen M. Immergut, 1998. "The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism," Politics & Society, , vol. 26(1), pages 5-34, March.
    7. Thelen,Kathleen, 2004. "How Institutions Evolve," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521837682, October.
    8. Boix, Carles & Svolik, Milan, 2009. "The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships," Papers 10-21-2009b, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
    9. Thelen,Kathleen, 2004. "How Institutions Evolve," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521546744, October.
    10. Kathleen Collins, 2009. "Economic and Security Regionalism among Patrimonial Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Central Asia," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 61(2), pages 249-281.
    11. José Cheibub & Jennifer Gandhi & James Vreeland, 2010. "Democracy and dictatorship revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(1), pages 67-101, April.
    12. Pierson, Paul, 2000. "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 251-267, June.
    13. Jennifer Gandhi & Adam Przeworski, 2006. "Cooperation, Cooptation, And Rebellion Under Dictatorships," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(1), pages 1-26, March.
    14. Dmitriy Gershenson & Herschel I. Grossman, 2001. "Cooption and Repression in the Soviet Union," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(1), pages 31-47, March.
    15. Hall, Peter A. & Taylor, Rosemary C. R., 1996. "Political science and the three new institutionalisms," MPIfG Discussion Paper 96/6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
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