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Is China Recolonizing Africa? Some Views from Tanzania

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  • Abel Kinyondo

Abstract

This study assesses Sino‐African cooperation with a view to understanding its nature and subsequently identifying ways to improve it. Using a mixed method that combined in‐depth interviews, Afrobarometer, and Johns Hopkins’ China Africa Research Initiative (CARI) data, I find that, despite a few gains, China takes the lion's share of benefits from the cooperation. Indeed, the balance of trade is skewed toward China, and there is very little Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) flowing to Africa. Moreover, ‘debt trap diplomacy’ is crippling African economies, raising alarm over whether China intends to recolonize the continent. Also, while Chinese aid is negligible, the amount of contracts revenues and diplomatic support it gets from the continent makes one think Africa deserves more from the cooperation. Nevertheless, China, just like any other country, acts in its nation's interest. Therefore, it is incumbent upon African countries to ensure that they demand more from the cooperation. In the end, to address China's hegemony over Sino‐African cooperation, Africa should prioritize the development of local content through technological and skill transfers, curb corruption, and build a critical mass of negotiators. Este estudio buscó evaluar la cooperación entre China y África con el fin de comprender su naturaleza y, posteriormente, identificar formas de mejorarla. Utilizando un método mixto que combinó entrevistas en profundidad, datos de Afrobarometer y Johns Hopkins (CARI) encontramos que, a pesar de algunas pocas ganancias, China se lleva la mayor parte de los beneficios de la cooperación. De hecho, la balanza comercial está sesgada hacia China y hay muy poca IED china que fluye hacia África. Por otra parte, la diplomacia de la trampa de la deuda está paralizando las economías africanas al punto de alarmar si China tiene la intención de recolonizar el continente. Además, si bien la ayuda china es insignificante, la cantidad de ingresos por contratos y el apoyo diplomático que recibe del continente hace pensar que África merece más cooperación. Sin embargo, se observa que, al igual que cualquier otro país, China actúa en interés de su nación, por lo tanto, corresponde a los países africanos garantizar que exijan más cooperación. Al final, para abordar la hegemonía de China sobre la cooperación chino‐africana, África debe priorizar el desarrollo de contenido local a través de transferencias tecnológicas y de habilidades, frenar la corrupción y construir una masa crítica de negociadores. 本研究旨在评估中非合作,以了解中非合作的性质,并找出改进中非合作的途径。通过结合深度访谈、非洲晴雨表,约翰·霍普金数据以及CARI的研究方法,笔者发现,尽管合作取得了一些成果,中国仍然从合作中获得了最大利益。事实上,贸易平衡向中国倾斜,中国对非直接投资很少。此外,债务陷阱外交正在使非洲经济陷入瘫痪,以至于中国是否打算重新占领非洲大陆的话题引起了恐慌。再者,尽管中国的援助微不足道,但它从非洲大陆获得的契约收入和外交支持,让人认为非洲应该从合作中获益更多。然而,笔者注意到,中国同其他任何国家一样采取符合本国利益的行动。因此非洲国家有责任确保自己对合作提出更多的要求。最后,为了解决中国在中非合作问题上的霸主地位,非洲应优先通过技术和技能转让来发展当地内容,遏制腐败,并培养众多的谈判家。

Suggested Citation

  • Abel Kinyondo, 2019. "Is China Recolonizing Africa? Some Views from Tanzania," World Affairs, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 182(2), pages 128-164, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:woraff:v:182:y:2019:i:2:p:128-164
    DOI: 10.1177/0043820019839331
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Abel Kinyondo & Riccardo Pelizzo & Mwoya Byaro, 2021. "“DELIVER AFRICA FROM DEBTS”: Good Governance Alone is not Enough to Save the Continent From Debt Onslaught," World Affairs, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 184(3), pages 318-338, September.
    2. Mbate, Michael, 2025. "Financing Africa's transition minerals: Chinese capital, control structures, and developmental constraints," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    3. Adeoye O. Akinola & Oluwaseun Tella, 2022. "Covid‐19 And South Africa–China Asymmetric Relations," World Affairs, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 185(3), pages 587-614, September.
    4. Lambin, Roosa & Muangi, Winnie C., 2025. "Social protection and coloniality: Learning from the past and present. Tanzania case study," IDOS Discussion Papers 20/2025, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

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