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Protecting From Malware Obfuscation Attacks Through Adversarial Risk Analysis

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  • Alberto Redondo
  • David Ríos Insua

Abstract

Malware constitutes a major global risk affecting millions of users each year. Standard algorithms in detection systems perform insufficiently when dealing with malware passed through obfuscation tools. We illustrate this studying in detail an open source metamorphic software, making use of a hybrid framework to obtain the relevant features from binaries. We then provide an improved alternative solution based on adversarial risk analysis which we illustrate describe with an example.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Redondo & David Ríos Insua, 2020. "Protecting From Malware Obfuscation Attacks Through Adversarial Risk Analysis," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(12), pages 2598-2609, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:riskan:v:40:y:2020:i:12:p:2598-2609
    DOI: 10.1111/risa.13567
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Nageswara S. V. Rao & Stephen W. Poole & Chris Y. T. Ma & Fei He & Jun Zhuang & David K. Y. Yau, 2016. "Defense of Cyber Infrastructures Against Cyber‐Physical Attacks Using Game‐Theoretic Models," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(4), pages 694-710, April.
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