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On the inspection game

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  • Thomas S. Ferguson
  • Costis Melolidakis

Abstract

The Inspection Game is a multistage game between a customs inspector and a smuggler, first studied by Melvin Dresher and Michael Maschler in the 1960s. An extension allowing the smuggler to act more than once, treated by Sakaguchi in a special case, is solved. Also, a more natural version of Sakaguchi's problem is solved in the special case where the smuggler may act at each stage. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 45: 327–334, 1998

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas S. Ferguson & Costis Melolidakis, 1998. "On the inspection game," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 45(3), pages 327-334, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:navres:v:45:y:1998:i:3:p:327-334
    DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1520-6750(199804)45:33.0.CO;2-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marlin U. Thomas & Yair Nisgav, 1976. "An infiltration game with time dependent payoff," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 23(2), pages 297-302, June.
    2. Andrej Yu Garnaev, 1994. "A remark on the customs and smuggler game," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(2), pages 287-293, March.
    3. Michael Maschler, 1966. "A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non‐constant‐sum game," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 11-33, March.
    4. Harvey Diamond, 1982. "Minimax Policies for Unobservable Inspections," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 139-153, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bernhard von Stengel, 2016. "Recursive Inspection Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(3), pages 935-952, August.
    2. Ryusuke Hohzaki & Diasuke Kudoh & Toru Komiya, 2006. "An inspection game: Taking account of fulfillment probabilities of players' aims," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(8), pages 761-771, December.
    3. Guzmán, Cristóbal & Riffo, Javiera & Telha, Claudio & Van Vyve, Mathieu, 2022. "A sequential Stackelberg game for dynamic inspection problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 302(2), pages 727-739.
    4. Dong, Xiaoqing & Li, Chaolin & Li, Ji & Wang, Jia & Huang, Wantao, 2010. "A game-theoretic analysis of implementation of cleaner production policies in the Chinese electroplating industry," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 54(12), pages 1442-1448.
    5. Nourinejad, Mehdi & Gandomi, Amir & Roorda, Matthew J., 2020. "Illegal parking and optimal enforcement policies with search friction," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    6. Endre Csóka & Thomas Lidbetter, 2016. "The solution to an open problem for a caching game," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(1), pages 23-31, February.

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