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An inspection game: Taking account of fulfillment probabilities of players' aims

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  • Ryusuke Hohzaki
  • Diasuke Kudoh
  • Toru Komiya

Abstract

This paper deals with an inspection game of customs and a smuggler. The customs can take two options of assigning a patrol or not. The smuggler has two strategies of shipping its cargo of contraband or not. Two players have several opportunities to take actions during a limited number of days. When both players do, there are some possibilities that the customs captures the smuggler and, simultaneously, the smuggler possibly makes a success of the smuggling. If the smuggler is captured or there remain no days for playing the game, the game ends. In this paper, we formulate the problem into a multi‐stage two‐person zero‐sum stochastic game and investigate some characteristics of the equilibrium solution, some of which are given in a closed form in a special case. There have been some studies so far on the inspection game. However, some consider the case that the smuggler has only one opportunity of smuggling or the perfect‐capture case that the customs can certainly arrest the smuggler on patrol, and others think of a recursive game without the probabilities of fulfilling the players' purposes. In this paper, we consider the inspection game taking account of the fulfillment probabilities of the players' aims. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Ryusuke Hohzaki & Diasuke Kudoh & Toru Komiya, 2006. "An inspection game: Taking account of fulfillment probabilities of players' aims," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(8), pages 761-771, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:navres:v:53:y:2006:i:8:p:761-771
    DOI: 10.1002/nav.20167
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