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The Impact of Firing Restrictions on Labour Market Equilibrium in the Presence of On‐the‐job Search

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  • Fabien Postel‐Vinay
  • Hélène Turon

Abstract

Job-to-job turnover provides a way for employers to escape statutory firing costs, as unprofitable workers may willfully quit their job on receiving an outside offer, or may be induced to accept one that they would otherwise reject with a negotiated severance package. We formalise those mechanisms within an extension of the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides model that allows for employed job search. We find that our model explains why higher firing costs intensify job-to-job turnover at the expense of transitions out of unemployment and that ignoring on-the-job Search leads one to overstate the adverse impact of firing costs on employment.
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Suggested Citation

  • Fabien Postel‐Vinay & Hélène Turon, 2014. "The Impact of Firing Restrictions on Labour Market Equilibrium in the Presence of On‐the‐job Search," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(575), pages 31-61, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:124:y:2014:i:575:p:31-61
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecoj.2014.124.issue-575
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    Cited by:

    1. Borys, Paweł & Doligalski, Paweł & Kopiec, Paweł, 2021. "The quantitative importance of technology and demand shocks for unemployment fluctuations in a shopping economy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    2. Francesco Zanetti & Konstantinos Theodoridis, 2018. "State Dependence in Labor Market Fluctuations: Evidence, Theory, and Policy Implications," Economics Series Working Papers 856, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    3. Di Addario, Sabrina & Kline, Patrick & Saggio, Raffaele & Sølvsten, Mikkel, 2023. "It ain’t where you’re from, it’s where you’re at: Hiring origins, firm heterogeneity, and wages," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 233(2), pages 340-374.
    4. Ronald Bachmann & Peggy Bechara & Christina Vonnahme, 2020. "Occupational Mobility in Europe: Extent, Determinants and Consequences," De Economist, Springer, vol. 168(1), pages 79-108, March.
    5. Ying Tung Chan & Chi Man Yip, 2023. "On the ambiguity of job search," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(4), pages 1006-1033, October.
    6. Juan J. Dolado & Etienne Lalé & Nawid Siassi, 2021. "From dual to unified employment protection: Transition and steady state," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), pages 547-585, May.
    7. Etienne Lale, 2019. "Labor-market Frictions, Incomplete Insurance and Severance Payments," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 31, pages 411-435, January.
    8. Sabrina Di Addario & Patrick Kline & Raffaele Saggio & Mikkel Soelvsten, 2022. "It ain't where you're from it's where you're at: firm effects, state dependence, and the gender wage gap," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1374, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    9. Kline, Patrick, 2024. "Firm wage effects," Handbook of Labor Economics,, Elsevier.
    10. Garcia-Louzao, Jose, 2022. "Workers’ job mobility in response to severance pay generosity," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    11. Marco Francesconi & Daniela Sonedda, 2024. "Does Weaker Employment Protection Lower the Cost of Job Loss?," CESifo Working Paper Series 11417, CESifo.
    12. Boeri, Tito & Garibaldi, Pietro & Moen, Espen R., 2014. "Severance Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 10182, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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