The Impact of Firing Restrictions on Labour Market Equilibrium in the Presence of On‐the‐job Search
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Fabien Postel-Vinay & Hélène Turon, 2014. "The Impact of Firing Restrictions on Labor Market Equilibrium in the Presence of On-the-job Search," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/5e9a6u2pke9, Sciences Po.
References listed on IDEAS
- Adriana D. Kugler & Gilles Saint-Paul, 2004. "How Do Firing Costs Affect Worker Flows in a World with Adverse Selection?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 553-584, July.
- Fella, Giulio, 2007. "When do firing taxes matter?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 24-31, October.
- Pedro Portugal & Olivier Blanchard, 2001. "What Hides Behind an Unemployment Rate: Comparing Portuguese and U.S. Labor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 187-207, March.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Boeri, Tito & Garibaldi, Pietro & Moen, Espen R, 2014. "Severance Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 10182, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Etienne Lalé, 2014. "Labor-market Frictions, Incomplete Insurance and Severance Payments," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 14/648, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK, revised 16 Aug 2016.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:124:y:2014:i:575:p:31-61. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/resssea.html .