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Candidate Qualities through a Partisan Lens: A Theory of Trait Ownership

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  • Danny Hayes

Abstract

Using Petrocik's (1996) theory of issue ownership as a point of departure, I develop and test a theory of “trait ownership” that provides an explanation for the origins of candidate trait perceptions and illustrates an important way that candidates affect voters. Specifically, I argue for a direct connection between the issues owned by a political party and evaluations of the personal attributes of its candidates. As a result, the American public views Republicans as stronger leaders and more moral, while Democrats hold advantages on compassion and empathy. I also draw on “expectations gap” arguments from psychology and political science to demonstrate how a candidate may gain an electoral advantage by successfully “trespassing” on his opponent's trait territory. National Election Studies data from the 1980–2004 presidential elections are used to demonstrate the existence, durability, and effects of trait ownership in contemporary American political campaigns.

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  • Danny Hayes, 2005. "Candidate Qualities through a Partisan Lens: A Theory of Trait Ownership," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 49(4), pages 908-923, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:49:y:2005:i:4:p:908-923
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00163.x
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    1. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ponce, Aldo F, 2013. "What Do Parties Do in Congress? Explaining the Allocation of Legislative Specialization," MPRA Paper 46573, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Bianca Nayeli Chacon Montoya & Carlos Emmanuel Saldaña Villanueva, 2023. "Determinants of Mayors’ approval ratings in Mexico (Determinantes de la aprobacion de alcaldes en Mexico)," Sobre México. Revista de Economía, Sobre México. Temas en economía, vol. 1(8), pages 47-68.
    3. Morelli, Massimo & Gennaro, Gloria & Lecce, Giampaolo, 2021. "Mobilization and the Strategy of Populism Theory and Evidence from the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers 15686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Lasse Laustsen & Michael Bang Petersen, 2020. "Online Tallies and the Context of Politics: How Online Tallies Make Dominant Candidates Appear Competent in Contexts of Conflict," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(2), pages 240-255, April.
    5. ENDO Yuya & ONO Yoshikuni, 2021. "Gender Stereotypes among Japanese Voters," Discussion papers 21061, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    6. Pablo Gutiérrez-Rodríguez & Ricardo Villarreal & Pedro Cuesta-Valiño & Shelley A. Blozis, 2023. "Valuation of candidate brand equity dimensions and voting intention: alternative polling data in the Spanish presidential election," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-10, December.
    7. Fernanda Herrera, 2021. "Partisan affect and political outsiders," Papers 2108.05943, arXiv.org.

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