Il salario tra premio di risultato e nuove pratiche di gestione delle risorse umane. Gli effetti dell’Accordo di Luglio del 1993
The theoretical result according to which the wage is higher when bargaining and efficiency wages interact, is tested by estimating a formally derived wage equation on an Italian firm-level panel from 1990 to 1999. The 1993 July Agreement, which fostered the adoption of decentralised incentive mechanisms, is used as a natural experiment. The main results are the following: a) Subsequent the adoption of the 1993 Agreement, the elasticity of wages to firm profits increases from 2.6 to 3.6%; the corresponding estimated wage premium is equal to 3.6% of the average wage; b) Relative to the whole sample of firms, those that signed the decentralised contract show higher wages, more persist- ent wage dynamics but lower variable wage premia; c) For the same firms, a significant increase of the rent sharing is obtained through the diffusion of individual incentives and productivity evaluation procedures; d) a considerable bias is introduced if are not profit endogeneity and unobservable fixed effects are not accounted for.
Volume (Year): 113 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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