An Equilibrium Analysis of Real Estate Leases
This article provides a unified equilibrium approach to valuing commercial real estate leases. Using a game-theoretic variant of real options analysis, the underlying real estate asset market is modeled as a continuous-time Nash equilibrium, where developers make construction decisions under demand uncertainty. Then, using the economic notion that leasing represents the purchase of the use of the asset over a specified time, I use a contingent-claims approach to value many of the most common leasing arrangements. The model provides equilibrium values for purchase options, forward leases, gross and net leases, cancellation options, ground leases, escalation clauses, lease concessions, and sale-leasebacks.
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