Road Pricing and Bus Service Policies
This paper focuses on the fare and frequency of bus services when underpriced automobiles and buses use the same road. Three types of bus provision are considered: (1) second-best, (2) private monopolistic operation, and (3) operation under zero-profit constraint. By incorporating congestion interaction, this paper derives a decision rule on each bus service. Moreover, by investigating the effect of road pricing, it is shown that the direction of change in bus fares and private welfare depends on type of provision. More importantly, it is shown that private welfare can be improved even without revenue recycling due to the congestion interaction. © 2009 LSE and the University of Bath
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Volume (Year): 43 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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