Robust stability in matching markets
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References listed on IDEAS
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 364-367, May.
- Chakraborty, Archishman & Citanna, Alessandro & Ostrovsky, Michael, 2010. "Two-sided matching with interdependent values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 85-105, January.
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- Kojima, Fuhito, 2013. "Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 1-14.
- Archishman Chakraborty & Alessandro Citanna & Michael Ostrovsky, 2015. "Group stability in matching with interdependent values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(1), pages 3-24, March.
- repec:eee:gamebe:v:107:y:2018:i:c:p:1-20 is not listed on IDEAS
- Mustafa Afacan, 2014. "Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(3), pages 493-514, August.
- repec:eee:mateco:v:72:y:2017:i:c:p:16-24 is not listed on IDEAS
- Oğuz Afacan, Mustafa, 2012. "Group robust stability in matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 394-398.
- Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2013. "Application fee manipulations in matching markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 446-453.
- Kumano, Taro, 2013. "Strategy-proofness and stability of the Boston mechanism: An almost impossibility result," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 23-29.
- Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2016. "Enrollment manipulations in school choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 119-125.
- Chen, Yajing, 2014. "When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 43-45.
- Ning Sun & Zaifu Yang, 2016. "A Theory of Marriage with Mutually Consented Divorces," Discussion Papers 16/14, Department of Economics, University of York.
More about this item
KeywordsMatching; stability; strategy-proofness; robust stability; acyclicity;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
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