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The governance mechanism of Russian firms: its self-enforcing nature and limitations

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  • Ichiro Iwasaki

Abstract

The legal form of business enterprises in contemporary Russia is diversified to almost the same extent as those in major advanced countries. Joint-stock companies are now the most common form of incorporation among leading industrial enterprises. The law on joint-stock companies in Russia provides for the governance mechanism of joint-stock companies, in order to implement the concept of a 'self-enforcing' organisation in which the legal code of business management should be observed voluntarily by managers and large stockholders. This fundamental idea is embodied in many aspects of the current system, including the mechanism of management and supervision characterised as 'diarchial leadership', the balance of power between stockholders and corporate officers, and the internal audit system. However, the self-enforcing nature of the Russian enterprise has been undermined by a number of factors, including the overwhelming expansion of closed joint-stock companies, the predominance of insider ownership, the short history of internal auditing and the lack of legal enforcement power. As a result, breaches of company law are rampant in Russia today. This raises serious problems for the Russian corporate system, along with the legal peculiarity of privatised firms and people's enterprises, which complicates the system of joint-stock companies and deprives it of transparency.

Suggested Citation

  • Ichiro Iwasaki, 2003. "The governance mechanism of Russian firms: its self-enforcing nature and limitations," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(4), pages 503-531.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:pocoec:v:15:y:2003:i:4:p:503-531
    DOI: 10.1080/1463137032000140294
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Masahiko Aoki, 2013. "The Contingent Governance Of Teams: Analysis Of Institutional Complementarity," Chapters, in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 14, pages 230-249, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrei Yakovlev, 2004. "Evolution of corporate governance in Russia: government policy vs. real incentives of economic agents," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 387-403.
    2. Iwasaki, Ichiro & Ma, Xinxin & Mizobata, Satoshi, 2024. "Board structure in emerging markets: A simultaneous equation modeling," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    3. Ichiro Iwasaki, 2007. "Enterprise Reform And Corporate Governance In Russia: A Quantitative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(5), pages 849-902, December.

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