Strategic R&D Investment Under Liability Law
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DOI: 10.1080/13571516.2012.715270
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References listed on IDEAS
- Shavell, Steven, 2007. "Liability for Accidents," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 139-182, Elsevier.
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"Optimal Damages Multipliers in Oligopolistic Markets,"
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- Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2012. "Optimal damages multipliers in oligopolistic markets," DICE Discussion Papers 80, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2012. "Optimal Damages Multipliers in Oligopolistic Markets," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-08, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
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