IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/fosoec/v39y2010i3p287-294.html

Securitization, Social Distance, and Financial Crises

Author

Listed:
  • David Zalewski

Abstract

Because the process of securitizing home mortgages played a critical role in precipitating the recent financial crisis, it is widely agreed that this market must be reformed to prevent future collapses. Most proposals focus on improving the dissemination of information among securitization participants, and on strengthening incentives to discourage excessive risk-taking. This paper argues that because securitization involves the commodification of the lending relationship, it reinforces the type of self-interested behavior that often undermines regulatory efforts. What are needed are structural reforms that encourage moral behavior by narrowing the social distance between lenders and borrowers. This can be accomplished by a return to traditional banking lending, supplemented by the use of covered bonds to loosen credit constraints and to help financial intermediaries manage market risk.

Suggested Citation

  • David Zalewski, 2010. "Securitization, Social Distance, and Financial Crises," Forum for Social Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(3), pages 287-294, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:fosoec:v:39:y:2010:i:3:p:287-294
    DOI: 10.1007/s12143-010-9063-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s12143-010-9063-8
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s12143-010-9063-8?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Greg Hannsgen, 2004. "Borrowing Alone: The Theory and Policy Implications of the Commodification of Finance," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_401, Levy Economics Institute.
    2. Ingo Fender & Janet Mitchell, 2009. "The future of securitisation: how to align incentives," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sylwester Kozak & Olga Teplova, 2012. "Securitization As A Tool Of Bank Liquidity And Funding Management Before And After The Crisis: The Case Of The Eu," "e-Finanse", University of Information Technology and Management, Institute of Financial Research and Analysis, vol. 8(4), pages 30-43, February.
    2. Ngwu, Franklin N. & Chen, Zheyang, 2016. "Regulation of securitisation in China: Learning from the US experience," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 477-488.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. David Zalewski, 2010. "Securitization, Social Distance, and Financial Crises," Forum for Social Economics, Springer;The Association for Social Economics, vol. 39(3), pages 287-294, October.
    2. Blaise Gadanecz & Alper Kara & Philip Molyneux, 2011. "The value of repeat lending," BIS Working Papers 350, Bank for International Settlements.
    3. Malekan, Sara & Dionne, Georges, 2014. "Securitization and optimal retention under moral hazard," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 74-85.
    4. Jaime Caruana, 2010. "Financial Stability: Ten Questions and about Seven Answers," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: Christopher Kent & Michael Robson (ed.),Reserve Bank of Australia 50th Anniversary Symposium, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    5. Bernd Rudolph, 2010. "Die internationale Finanzkrise als Anstoß für Weiterentwicklungen im Risikocontrolling der Banken und für Reformen in der Bankregulierung," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 62(61), pages 122-149, January.
    6. Solomon Y. Deku & Alper Kara & Nodirbek Karimov, 2021. "Do investors value frequent issuers in securitization?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 57(4), pages 1247-1282, November.
    7. W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, 2010. "The Industrial Organization of the U.S. Single-Family Residential Mortgage Industry," Working Papers 10-11, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    8. Georges Dionne & Sara Malekan, 2017. "Optimal Form of Retention for Securitized Loans under Moral Hazard," Risks, MDPI, vol. 5(4), pages 1-13, October.
    9. Adonis Antoniades & Nikola Tarashev, 2014. "Securitisations: tranching concentrates uncertainty," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, December.
    10. Gabriella Chiesa, 2015. "Bankruptcy Remoteness and Incentive‐compatible Securitization," Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 24(2-3), pages 241-265, May.
    11. IANCU, Aurel, 2013. "Extending Financialisation and Increasing Fragility of the Financial System," Working Papers of National Institute for Economic Research 130307, Institutul National de Cercetari Economice (INCE).
    12. Deku, Solomon Y. & Kara, Alper & Zhou, Yifan, 2019. "Securitization, bank behaviour and financial stability: A systematic review of the recent empirical literature," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 245-254.
    13. Malamud, Semyon & Rui, Huaxia & Whinston, Andrew, 2013. "Optimal incentives and securitization of defaultable assets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 111-135.
    14. Roman Inderst & Sebastian Pfeil, 2013. "Securitization and Compensation in Financial Institutions," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(4), pages 1323-1364.
    15. Krahnen, Jan-Pieter & Wilde, Christian, 2022. "Skin-in-the-game in ABS transactions: A critical review of policy options," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    16. Albertazzi, Ugo & Eramo, Ginette & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Salleo, Carmelo, 2015. "Asymmetric information in securitization: An empirical assessment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 33-49.
    17. Frank A.G. den Butter, 2011. "The Macroeconomics of the Credit Crisis: In Search of Externalities for Macro Prudential Supervision," Chapters, in: Emiel F.M. Wubben (ed.), Institutions and Regulation for Economic Growth?, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Maarten van Oordt, 2017. "Credit Risk Transfer and Bank Insolvency Risk," Staff Working Papers 17-59, Bank of Canada.
    19. Yong Zhang & Jing Zhang, 2024. "The Choice of Optimal Risk Retention Forms from the Perspective of Asymmetric Information," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 12(22), pages 1-17, November.
    20. Ugo Albertazzi & Ginette Eramo & Leonardo Gambacorta & Carmelo Salleo, 2011. "Securitization is not that evil after all," BIS Working Papers 341, Bank for International Settlements.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:fosoec:v:39:y:2010:i:3:p:287-294. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RFSE20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.