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Organised crime and the economy: a framework for policy prescriptions


  • Andrea Mario Lavezzi


In this paper, we discuss policies to combat organised crime from the perspective of economic analysis. We introduce concepts such as supply and demand for Mafia and the implied notion of equilibrium to build a framework to classify the contexts in which organised crime interferes with economy. We then use this framework to discuss policy interventions, distinguishing between policies implemented by the State and mobilisation of civil society. We show that using the economic approach helps understand the aspect of persistence of criminal organisations and identify vicious circles of different nature. The broad spectrum of State policies identified includes norms on competition, on the efficiency of the State, on decriminalisation and on market deregulation. Finally, in discussing the mobilisation of civil society, we highlight the problem of coordination, an aspect often overlooked in the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Mario Lavezzi, 2014. "Organised crime and the economy: a framework for policy prescriptions," Global Crime, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(1-2), pages 164-190, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:fglcxx:v:15:y:2014:i:1-2:p:164-190
    DOI: 10.1080/17440572.2013.868626

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2009. "Weak institutions and credit availability: the impact of crime on bank loans," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 52, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michele Battisti & Andrea Mario Lavezzi & Lucio Masserini & Monica Pratesi, 2018. "Resisting the extortion racket: an empirical analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 1-37, August.
    2. Michele Battisti & Andrea Mario Lavezzi & Lucio Masserini & Monica Pratesi, 2014. "Resisting to the Extortion Racket: an Empirical Analysis," Working Papers LuissLab 14115, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli.

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