IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/ecinnt/v16y2007i7p517-539.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Public Sector Science And The Strategy Of The Commons

Author

Listed:
  • Ajay Agrawal
  • Lorenzo Garlappi

Abstract

We model the conditions under which incumbent firms may purposefully create an intellectual property (IP) commons such that no firm has the incentive to invest in new product development, despite the potential profitability of a public sector invention. The strategy of spoiling incentives to innovate by eliminating exclusive IP rights—the strategy of the commons—is motivated by a fear of cannibalization and supported by a credible threat. We show how the degree of potential cannibalization is related to this market failure and characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium in which the strategy of the commons is played.

Suggested Citation

  • Ajay Agrawal & Lorenzo Garlappi, 2007. "Public Sector Science And The Strategy Of The Commons," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(7), pages 517-539.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:ecinnt:v:16:y:2007:i:7:p:517-539
    DOI: 10.1080/10438590600914627
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10438590600914627
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rosell, Carlos & Agrawal, Ajay, 2009. "Have university knowledge flows narrowed?: Evidence from patent data," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-13, February.
    2. Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Thursby, Marie & Thursby, Jerry, 2009. "Shirking, sharing risk and shelving: The role of university license contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 80-91, January.
    3. Foray, Dominique & Lissoni, Francesco, 2010. "University Research and Public–Private Interaction," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, Elsevier.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:ecinnt:v:16:y:2007:i:7:p:517-539. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Chris Longhurst). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/GEIN20 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.