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Banking reforms, performance and risk in China

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  • Liangliang He
  • Lei Chen
  • Frank Hong Liu

Abstract

We investigate the impact of the banking reform started from 2005 on ownership structures in China on commercial banks’ profitability, efficiency and risk over the period 2000–2012, providing comprehensive evidence on the impact of banking reform in China. We find that banks on average tend to have higher profitability, lower risk and lower efficiency after the reforms, and the results are robust with our difference-in-difference approach. Our results also show that the Big 5 state-owned banks (SOCB) underperform banks with other types of ownership when risk is measured by non-performing loans (NPLs) over the entire study period but tend to have fewer NPLs than other banks during the post-reform period. Our results provide some supporting evidence on the ongoing banking reforms in China, suggesting that attracting strategic foreign investors and listing SOCBs on stock exchanges appear to be effective ways to help SOCBs deal with the problem of NPLs and manage their risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Liangliang He & Lei Chen & Frank Hong Liu, 2017. "Banking reforms, performance and risk in China," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(40), pages 3995-4012, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:49:y:2017:i:40:p:3995-4012
    DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2016.1273501
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ilko Naaborg & Robert Lensink, 2008. "Banking in transition economies: does foreign ownership enhance profitability?," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(7), pages 545-562.
    2. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
    3. Shelagh Heffernan & Xiaoqing Fu, 2010. "Determinants of financial performance in Chinese banking," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(20), pages 1585-1600.
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