Deregulation and governance: plight of Japanese banks in the 1990s
The governance structure of public corporations is determined by the agency relationship between shareholders and managers, and the agency theory predicts that deregulation of an industry leads to governance adaptation. Deregulation of the Japanese banking business in the 1980s offers an interesting case study in this framework, as Japanese banks fell into serious solvency problems in the post-deregulation 1990s. This paper investigates whether ineffective governance was responsible for the plight of Japanese banks. The sample is 384 corporations that were listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange between 1983 and 1990, which includes 59 banks. One of the findings is that bank shareholders allowed more diffuse ownership structure after deregulation, which demonstrates that the agency theory did not hold for shareholders of Japanese banks.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 36 (2004)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/RAEC20|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEC20|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- James R. Rhodes & Naoyuki Yoshino, 1999. "Window Guidance By The Bank Of Japan: Was Lending Controlled?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 17(2), pages 166-176, 04.
- Kole, Stacey R. & Lehn, Kenneth M., 1999. "Deregulation and the adaptation of governance structure: the case of the U.S. airline industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 79-117, April.
- Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
- Yafeh, Y. & Yosha, O., 1995. "Large Shareholders and Banks: Who Monitors and How," Papers 04-95, Tel Aviv.
- Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1986.
"Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,"
3606237, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
- Yafeh, Yishay & Yosha, Oved, 1995. "Large Shareholders and Banks: Who Monitors and How?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1178, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:36:y:2004:i:5:p:479-484. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.