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Distinguishing characteristics of degrees of success and failure in economic sanctions episodes


  • Shane Bonetti


This paper uses 104 episodes from the Hufbauer et al. (1985, 1990) dataset to examine the correlates of classes of outcomes of economic sanctions. The parsimonious equations presented identify the characteristics of sanctions episodes conducive to success rather than marginal success, and the characteristics productive of failure rather than marginal failure. Failure is most likely if there is significant third party assistance to the target, and if the pre-existing trade linkage between sender and target is small. Success is most easily achieved when the objective is not classified as 'modest', and when pre-sanction relations between sender and target are cordial or neutral. The equations presented overcome data and methodological flaws of earlier studies, exhibit reasonable predictive accuracy, and satisfy a battery of tests of statistical significance, hypothesized coefficient sign, goodness of fit, high likelihood and informational efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Shane Bonetti, 1998. "Distinguishing characteristics of degrees of success and failure in economic sanctions episodes," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(6), pages 805-813.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:30:y:1998:i:6:p:805-813
    DOI: 10.1080/000368498325507

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 1994. "Economic Diplomacy, Trade And Commercial Policy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 447.
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    Cited by:

    1. Caruso Raul, 2003. "The Impact of International Economic Sanctions on Trade: An Empirical Analysis," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 1-36, April.
    2. Madhu Sudan Ravindran, 2012. "China’s Potential for Economic Coercion in the South China Sea Disputes: A Comparative Study of the Philippines and Vietnam," Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Institute of Asian Studies, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, vol. 31(3), pages 105-132.
    3. Dreger, Christian & Kholodilin, Konstantin A. & Ulbricht, Dirk & Fidrmuc, Jarko, 2016. "Between the Hammer and the Anvil: The Impact of Economic Sanctions and Oil Prices on Russia’s Ruble," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 295-308.
    4. Bayramov, Vugar & Rustamli, Nabi & Abbas, Gulnara, 2020. "Collateral damage: The Western sanctions on Russia and the evaluation of implications for Russia’s post-communist neighbourhood," International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 92-109.
    5. Christian Dreger & Jarko Fidrmuc & Konstantin Kholodilin & Dirk Ulbricht, 2015. "The Ruble between the Hammer and the Anvil: Oil Prices and Economic Sanctions," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1488, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    6. Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 2009. "Economic Diplomacy and the Geography of International Trade," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13518.
    7. William Seitz & Alberto Zazzaro, 2019. "Sanctions and Public Opinion: The Case of the Russia-Ukraine Gas Disputes," CSEF Working Papers 529, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    8. Menevis Cilizoglu & Navin A Bapat, 2020. "Economic coercion and the problem of sanctions-proofing," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(4), pages 385-408, July.
    9. Morad Bali, 2018. "The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Russia and its Six Greatest European Trade Partners," Post-Print halshs-01918521, HAL.
    10. William Seitz & Alberto Zazzaro, 0. "Sanctions and public opinion: The case of the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-27.
    11. T. Clifton Morgan & Navin Bapat & Yoshiharu Kobayashi, 2014. "Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(5), pages 541-558, November.
    12. Andreea-Emanuela Dragoi & Ana-Cristina Balgar, 2016. "Economic Sanctions against Russia. A Critical Evaluation," Knowledge Horizons - Economics, Faculty of Finance, Banking and Accountancy Bucharest,"Dimitrie Cantemir" Christian University Bucharest, vol. 8(1), pages 63-67, March.
    13. Valentin L. Krustev & T. Clifton Morgan, 2011. "Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(4), pages 351-376, September.
    14. Gabriel Felbermayr & Erdal Yalcin & Philipp Grübener, 2014. "Ökonomische Aspekte des Russlandkonfliktes: Ursachen, Kosten, Optionen," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 67(14), pages 35-43, July.
    15. Andreea – Emanuela Drǎgoi & Napoleon Pop, 2016. "Scenario Analysis for the Perspectives of the EU-Russian Federation Relationship," Global Economic Observer, "Nicolae Titulescu" University of Bucharest, Faculty of Economic Sciences;Institute for World Economy of the Romanian Academy, vol. 4(2), pages 66-73, November.
    16. van Bergeijk, Peter A. G. & Siddiquee, Muhammad Shahadat Hossain, 2015. "Bias and methodological change in economic sanction reconsidered," Economics Discussion Papers 2015-33, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    17. William Seitz & Alberto Zazzaro, 2020. "Sanctions and public opinion: The case of the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 817-843, October.
    18. Mikhail A Alexseev & Henry E Hale, 2020. "Crimea come what may: Do economic sanctions backfire politically?," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(2), pages 344-359, March.

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