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Economic Sanctions And Culture

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  • Donna Driscoll
  • Dennis Halcoussis
  • Anton D. Lowenberg

Abstract

We address empirically the question of why international economic sanctions are, or are not, chosen as instruments of foreign policy and the question of what determines their success. We hypothesize that cultural linkages between nations are an important factor in explaining both instrument choice and conflict outcomes. Countries that share significant cultural attributes are found to be less likely to apply economic sanctions against one another than countries lacking such cultural ties. However, it is precisely in the case of culturally similar sender and target nations that sanctions are most likely to succeed.

Suggested Citation

  • Donna Driscoll & Dennis Halcoussis & Anton D. Lowenberg, 2011. "Economic Sanctions And Culture," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(4), pages 423-448, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:22:y:2011:i:4:p:423-448
    DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2010.500826
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    Cited by:

    1. Demena, B.A. & Benalcazar Jativa, G. & Reta, A.S. & Kimararungu, P.B. & van Bergeijk, P.A.G., 2021. "Does research on economic sanctions suffer from publication bias?," ISS Working Papers - General Series 674, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.

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