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An application of adverse selection: rural agricultural production in China since the 1950s

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  • Ya-Ming Liu

Abstract

Asymmetric information problems in collective rural agricultural production in China after 1955 is examined by applying the theory of adverse selection. This application shows the movement of equilibrium stages from a pooling contract to a separating one can explain the process of rural reform in China from the collective institution arrangement to the household responsibility system.

Suggested Citation

  • Ya-Ming Liu, 2004. "An application of adverse selection: rural agricultural production in China since the 1950s," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(14), pages 915-917.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:11:y:2004:i:14:p:915-917
    DOI: 10.1080/1350485042000282213
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lin, Justin Yifu, 1990. "Collectivization and China's Agricultural Crisis in 1959-1961," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1228-1252, December.
    2. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
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