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Public Servants or Interest Agents? The Effects of Political-Business Collusion and Public Representation on Political Trust and Voting Intention

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  • Yu-Han Weng
  • Cheng-Hua Wang
  • Chung-Te Ting

Abstract

This study examines how citizens’ perceptions of elected representatives influence voting intention through the mediating role of political trust. An integrated framework is developed to incorporate both negative and positive evaluations of representatives, namely perceived political-business collusion and perceived public representation. Data were collected from 423 valid respondents in Tainan, Taiwan, and analyzed using structural equation modeling (SEM). The results indicate that perceived political-business collusion has a significant negative effect on political trust, whereas perceived public representation exerts a significant positive effect. Moreover, political trust significantly enhances voting intention. Mediation analysis further confirms that political trust serves as a key mechanism linking citizens’ evaluations of elected representatives to their behavioral intentions. This study contributes to the literature by demonstrating the dual effects of contrasting perceptions on political trust formation and highlighting the central role of political trust in shaping voting intention. The findings also provide important policy implications, suggesting that enhancing transparency, strengthening accountability, and improving representative responsiveness are essential for fostering political trust and promoting democratic participation. JEL classification numbers: D72, D73, H11.

Suggested Citation

  • Yu-Han Weng & Cheng-Hua Wang & Chung-Te Ting, 2026. "Public Servants or Interest Agents? The Effects of Political-Business Collusion and Public Representation on Political Trust and Voting Intention," Advances in Management and Applied Economics, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 16(5), pages 1-1.
  • Handle: RePEc:spt:admaec:v:16:y:2026:i:5:f:16_5_1
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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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