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Dezemberfieber senken: Vermeidung von verschwenderischen Jahresendausgaben
[Reducing “Dezemberfieber”: Wasteful Year-End Spending and a Solution]

Author

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  • Christoph Siemroth

    (University of Essex in Colchester)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Im öffentlichen Sektor laufen die Finanzmittel zum Jahresende aus, sodass die Verantwortlichen einen starken Anreiz haben, die verbleibenden Mittel kurz vor Ablauf der Frist ineffizient auszugeben. Die Arten von Ineffizienzen dieses Verhaltens, seine Ursachen und dessen Ausmaß werden erörtert sowie eine Lösung vorgeschlagen: Es sollte möglich sein, ungenutzte Mittel teilweise auf das nächste Jahr zu übertragen, wodurch Anreize geschaffen werden, am Jahresende nicht alles zu verschwenden. Der Teil, der nicht übertragen wird, kann zur Unterstützung unterfinanzierter Bereiche verwendet werden.

Suggested Citation

  • Christoph Siemroth, 2022. "Dezemberfieber senken: Vermeidung von verschwenderischen Jahresendausgaben [Reducing “Dezemberfieber”: Wasteful Year-End Spending and a Solution]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 102(6), pages 461-464, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:wirtsc:v:102:y:2022:i:6:d:10.1007_s10273-022-3213-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s10273-022-3213-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jeffrey B. Liebman & Neale Mahoney, 2017. "Do Expiring Budgets Lead to Wasteful Year-End Spending? Evidence from Federal Procurement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(11), pages 3510-3549, November.
    2. Andrey Malenko, 2019. "Optimal Dynamic Capital Budgeting," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(4), pages 1747-1778.
    3. Stuart Baumann, 2019. "Putting It Off for Later: Procrastination and End of Fiscal Year Spending Spikes," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(2), pages 706-735, April.
    4. Christoph Siemroth, 2024. "Ending Wasteful Year‐End Spending: On Optimal Budget Rules In Organizations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 65(3), pages 1163-1188, August.
    5. W.J. Hurley & Jack Brimberg & Brent Fisher, 2014. "Use it or lose it: On the incentives to spend annual defence operating budgets," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(4), pages 401-413, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    H83; G31;

    JEL classification:

    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies

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