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Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution

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  • Nejat Anbarci
  • Ching-jen Sun

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  • Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2011. "Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(3), pages 425-429, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:37:y:2011:i:3:p:425-429
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0497-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alvin E. Roth, 1977. "Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 2(1), pages 64-65, February.
    2. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2015. "Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 107-109.
    2. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2021. "No individual priorities and the Nash bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(4), pages 855-863, May.
    3. NAKAMURA, Kensei, 2023. "Characterizing the Nash bargaining solution with continuity and almost no individual rationality," Discussion Papers 2023-02, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    4. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
    5. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2015. "A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(2), pages 167-171, June.
    6. Dominik Karos & Nozomu Muto & Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2018. "A generalization of the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1169-1182, November.
    7. Osamu Mori, 2018. "Two simple characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(2), pages 225-232, August.

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