Lies and slander: truth-telling in repeated matching games with private monitoring
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Volume (Year): 37 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995. "Social Norms and Random Matching Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April.
- Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff, 2005.
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- Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff, 2000. "Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: 'Whitewashes' and 'Coverups'," Working Papers gueconwpa~01-01-03, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, revised 01 Jul 2001.
- Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff, 2001. " Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' ," Game Theory and Information 0107001, EconWPA.
- Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 581-593.
- Kurt Annen, 2001. "Inclusive and Exclusive Social Capital in the Small-Firm Sector in Developing Countries," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(2), pages 319-, June.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 1996.
"Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 281-297, August.
- Ben-Porath, E. & Kahneman, M., 1993. "Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Papers 15-93, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
- Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March.
- Greif, Avner, 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 912-50, October.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 2003. "Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 227-250, August.
- Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June.
- Annen, Kurt, 2003. "Social capital, inclusive networks, and economic performance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 449-463, April.
- Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, 03.
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