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Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade

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  • Lars-Gunnar Svensson

  • Bo Larsson

Abstract

We extend the Shapley-Scarf (1974) model - where a finite number of indivisible objects is to be allocated among a finite number of individuals - to the case where the primary endowment set of an individual may contain none, one, or several objects and where property rights may be transferred (objects inherited) as the allocation process unfolds, under the retained assumption that an individual consumes at most one object. In this environment we analyze the core of the economy and characterize the set of strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms. As an alternative approach, we consider property rights implicitly defined by a strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism and show a core property for the mechanism-induced endowment rule. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Lars-Gunnar Svensson & Bo Larsson, 2005. "Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(2), pages 167-190, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2005:i:2:p:167-190
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-005-0126-x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2016. "Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 167-177.
    2. Ehlers, Lars, 2014. "Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 64-87.
    3. Carroll, Gabriel, 2014. "A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 163-177.
    4. Ekici, Özgün, 2013. "Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 1-10.
    5. Larsson, Bo & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2006. "Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 272-287, December.
    6. Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2018. "Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 187-202.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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