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Organizational restructuring in response to changes in information-processing technology


  • Andrzej Baniak

    () (Department of Economics Central European University, 9 Nador u. 1051 Budapest Hungary)

  • Jacek Cukrowski

    () (The Economics Institute-CERGE, The Czech Academy of Sciences, P.O.Box 882, Politickych Veznu 7, 111 21 Prague 1, Czech Republic)


This paper examines the effects of changes in information-processing technology on the efficient organizational forms of data-processing in decision-making systems. Data-processing is modelled in the framework of the dynamic parallel processing model of associative computation with an endogenous set-up costs of the processors. In such a model, the conditions for efficient organization of information-processing are defined and the architecture of the efficient structures is considered. It is shown that decreasing returns to scale of the function describing data- processing technology and the information overload of the system are necessary and sufficient conditions for the hierarchical information- processing, respectively. Moreover, the size of the efficient structures is determined exclusively by their information workload and the current state of information-processing technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrzej Baniak & Jacek Cukrowski, 1999. "Organizational restructuring in response to changes in information-processing technology," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(4), pages 295-305.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:295-305 Note: Received: 5 June 1996 / Accepted: 17 June 1999

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    Cited by:

    1. Jacek Cukrowski & Manfred M. Fischer, 2007. "Efficient organization of information processing," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(1), pages 13-26.
    2. Dostie Benoit & Jayaraman Rajshri, 2012. "Organizational Redesign, Information Technologies and Workplace Productivity," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-41, February.
    3. M. Martin Boyer, 2004. "On the Use of Hierarchies to Complete Contracts when Players Have Limited Abilities," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-41, CIRANO.
    4. Orbay, Hakan, 2002. "Information Processing Hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 370-407, August.

    More about this item


    Technological changes; organizational restructuring; hierarchy; decision-making; information-processing;

    JEL classification:

    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other


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