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Discussion of “The impact of product market competition on the quantity and quality of voluntary disclosures”

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  • Christo Karuna

    (University of Houston)

Abstract

Li (2010, this issue) examines how product market competition affects voluntary disclosure by firms. Using several competition proxies, she finds that both the competitive threat from potential entrants into an industry and from existing rivals affect the quantity and accuracy of voluntary profit and investment forecasts by firms in that industry. However, the study’s findings are inconclusive mainly because each competition proxy used can reflect both types of competitive threat. The focus of my discussion is to provide some comments and suggestions for future researchers to consider in examining how the nature of product market competition affects voluntary firm disclosure.

Suggested Citation

  • Christo Karuna, 2010. "Discussion of “The impact of product market competition on the quantity and quality of voluntary disclosures”," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 712-723, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reaccs:v:15:y:2010:i:3:d:10.1007_s11142-010-9135-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s11142-010-9135-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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