IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v42y2013i1p29-53.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Strategic cooperation in cost sharing games

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Hoefer

    ()

Abstract

We examine strategic cost sharing games with so-called arbitrary sharing based on various combinatorial optimization problems. These games have recently been popular in computer science to study cost sharing in the context of the Internet. We concentrate on the existence and computational complexity of strong equilibria (SE), in which no coalition can improve the cost of each of its members. Our main result reveals a connection to the core in coalitional cost sharing games studied in operations research. For set cover and facility location games this results in a tight characterization of the existence of SE using the integrality gap of suitable linear programming formulations. Furthermore, it allows to derive all existing results for SE in network design cost sharing games with arbitrary sharing via a unified approach. In addition, we show that in general there is no efficiency loss, i.e., the strong price of anarchy is always 1. Finally, we indicate how the LP-approach is useful for the computation of near-optimal and near-stable approximate SE. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Hoefer, 2013. "Strategic cooperation in cost sharing games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 29-53, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:42:y:2013:i:1:p:29-53
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-011-0312-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-011-0312-8
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Epstein, Amir & Feldman, Michal & Mansour, Yishay, 2009. "Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 51-68, September.
    2. Andelman, Nir & Feldman, Michal & Mansour, Yishay, 2009. "Strong price of anarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 289-317, March.
    3. Daniel Granot & Michael Maschler, 1998. "Spanning network games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(4), pages 467-500.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Moulin, Hervé, 2014. "Pricing traffic in a spanning network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 475-490.
    2. Vincent Mak & Darryl A. Seale & Eyran J. Gisches & Amnon Rapoport & Meng Cheng & Myounghee Moon & Rui Yang, 2018. "A network ridesharing experiment with sequential choice of transportation mode," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 407-433, October.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:42:y:2013:i:1:p:29-53. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.