On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
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- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 364-367, May.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006.
"Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
639, Boston College Department of Economics.
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- Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
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- Martínez, Ruth & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge, 2012.
"On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 588-600.
- Ruth Martínez & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2009. "On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 803.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Ruth Martínez & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2009. "On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles," Working Papers 390, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsMatching; Stability; Substitutable preferences; Semilattice; C78; D71; D78;
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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