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Truthful mechanism design for bin packing with applications on cloud computing

Author

Listed:
  • Deshi Ye

    (Zhejiang University)

  • Feng Xie

    (Zhejiang University)

  • Guochuan Zhang

    (Zhejiang University)

Abstract

In this paper, we study a mechanism design for the bin packing problem, which can model a reversed auction on cloud computing. A cloud computing platform has a set of jobs and would like to rent VM instances to process these jobs from cloud providers. In the auction model, each cloud provider (agent) who owns VM instances will submit a bid on the costs for using such VM instances. The mechanism determines the number of VM instances from each agent, and payments that have to be paid for using the chosen VM instances. The utility of an agent is the payment received minus the true cost. Our proposed mechanism is a deterministic truthful mechanism that the utility of each agent is maximized by revealing the true cost. Next, we provide the analysis of the approximation ratios, and then run experiments using both realistic workload and uniformly random data to show the performance of the proposed mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Deshi Ye & Feng Xie & Guochuan Zhang, 0. "Truthful mechanism design for bin packing with applications on cloud computing," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-22.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jcomop:v::y::i::d:10.1007_s10878-020-00601-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10878-020-00601-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mu'alem, Ahuva & Nisan, Noam, 2008. "Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 612-631, November.
    2. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    3. Kang, Jangha & Park, Sungsoo, 2003. "Algorithms for the variable sized bin packing problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 147(2), pages 365-372, June.
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