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Democratic Participation

Author

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  • Shanti P. Chakravarty

    (Bangor University)

Abstract

Democracy is not just about the choice of policy determined by the aggregation of ballots cast in elections. It is also about managing tensions which may arise between proclaimed virtues of democratic values and the vicissitudes of public opinion. Further, a conundrum arises because it is not for the electorate to spend time and energy acquiring specialist knowledge about the efficacy of action, but the voters expect to be consulted on policy. It is a lofty ideal of democracy that the electorate can hold government responsible for adverse outcomes not expected by the voters when casting their ballots on policy. Resort to referendums does not necessarily resolve these contradictory demands of democracy, but it can amplify them.

Suggested Citation

  • Shanti P. Chakravarty, 2018. "Democratic Participation," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 235-254, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:homoec:v:35:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s41412-018-0074-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s41412-018-0074-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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