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Bounding revenue leakages at scale-bid timber auctions: evidence from Wisconsin state forest auctions

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  • M. Haley

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  • M. Haley, 2010. "Bounding revenue leakages at scale-bid timber auctions: evidence from Wisconsin state forest auctions," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 427-437, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:empeco:v:39:y:2010:i:2:p:427-437
    DOI: 10.1007/s00181-009-0311-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Philip A. Haile, 2001. "Auctions with Resale Markets: An Application to U.S. Forest Service Timber Sales," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 399-427, June.
    2. Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin, 2001. "Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 375-417, April.
    3. Baldwin, Laura H & Marshall, Robert C & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1997. "Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 657-699, August.
    4. Stephen G. Donald & Harry J. Paarsch & Jacques Robert, 2006. "An empirical model of the multi‐unit, sequential, clock auction," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(8), pages 1221-1247, December.
    5. Philip A. Haile & Elie Tamer, 2003. "Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 1-51, February.
    6. Harry J. Paarsch, 1993. "The Effect of Stumpage Rates on Timber Recovery," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(1), pages 107-120, February.
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