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The effects of regional migration on gross income of labour in Sweden

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  • Robert Nakosteen

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  • Olle Westerlund

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Abstract

In this article we study the effect of interregional migration on gross income of labour. The empirical analysis is based on Swedish household data for the period 1994 to 1995. We are primarily concerned with the allocation effect of migration on economic growth in an economy where the incentives for migration may be hampered by relatively high income taxes and transfers. A treatment-effect model for migration and income is estimated. The results indicate significant income gains from migration for the unemployed as well as for those who were employed prior to migration. The estimation results also indicate negative correlation between errors in the migration function and the income function. The hypothesis of no self-selection can be rejected. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Nakosteen & Olle Westerlund, 2004. "The effects of regional migration on gross income of labour in Sweden," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 83(3), pages 581-595, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:83:y:2004:i:3:p:581-595 DOI: 10.1007/s10110-004-0209-z
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    Cited by:

    1. Venhorst, V. & Cörvers, F., 2015. "Entry into working life: Spatial mobility and the job match quality of higher-educated graduates," ROA Research Memorandum 003, Maastricht University, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA).
    2. Verônica De Castro Lameira & Eduardo Gonçalves & Ricardo Da Silva Freguglia, 2016. "Migratory Effectiveness In The Labor Market: Evidence From Brazil," Anais do XLIII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 43rd Brazilian Economics Meeting] 228, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    3. Korpi, Martin & Clark, William A.V., 2015. "Internal migration and human capital theory: To what extent is it selective?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 31-34.
    4. Rosa Sanchis-Guarner & Enrique Lopez-Bazo, 2006. "Are Skilled Workers More Attracted to Economic Agglomerations?," ERSA conference papers ersa06p120, European Regional Science Association.
    5. Dijk, J. van & Broersma, L. & Edzes, A.J.E. & Venhorst, V.A, 2011. "Brain drain of brain gain? Hoger opgeleiden in grote steden in Nederland," Research Reports vavenhorst, University of Groningen, Urban and Regional Studies Institute (URSI).
    6. Di Cintio, Marco & Grassi, Emanuele, 2010. "Internal Migration and Wage Differentials among Italian University Graduates," MPRA Paper 26707, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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