Interactions between store brand introduction and information sharing decisions considering store brand spillover

This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to investigate store brand (SB) introduction and information sharing decisions within a co-opetitive supply chain between a national brand (NB) manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer chooses whether to introduce a store brand and share demand information with the NB manufacturer. In the main model, we consider that the retailer’s store brand introduction decision precedes the information sharing decision. We fully explore four scenarios involving the retailer’s strategic decision characteristics: no store brand introduction and no information sharing (NN), no store brand introduction and information sharing (NS), store brand introduction and no information sharing (IN), and store brand introduction and information sharing (IS). Our analysis draws the following interesting conclusions: Firstly, our research reveals that the NB manufacturer will benefit from SB introduction under certain conditions. Secondly, we demonstrate that the retailer’s store brand introduction and information sharing reinforce each other. Finally, our study also makes a contribution to how the degree of SB spillover and the fixed introduction cost affect the equilibrium strategy outcome.