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Auction for the Reservation of 800 MHz and 2.6 GHz Frequency Bands and its Importance for the Development of the Telecommunications Market in Poland

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  • Agnieszka Kuś

    (Państwowa Szkoła Wyższa im. Papieża Jana Pawła II w Białej Podlaskiej, Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych i Technicznych)

Abstract

The aim of this article is to analyze the first frequency auction in Poland in the context of its significance for the development of the Polish telecommunications market. The subject of the bid was frequencies licenses in the 800 and 2600 MHz bands required for the provision of broadband data services on mobile networks using LTE technology. Due to its innovative nature, this auction generated a lot of controversy among experts as well as the auction participants. The auctions lasted 116 days and generated revenue of over PLN 9 billion, which exceeded the expectations of the auction organizers several times.

Suggested Citation

  • Agnieszka Kuś, 2018. "Auction for the Reservation of 800 MHz and 2.6 GHz Frequency Bands and its Importance for the Development of the Telecommunications Market in Poland," Collegium of Economic Analysis Annals, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis, issue 49, pages 137-148.
    • Handle: RePEc:sgh:annals:i:49:y:2018:p:137-148
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 829-845, May.
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