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Management Fashion Pay-for-Performance for CEOs

Author

Listed:
  • Katja Rost
  • Margit Osterloh

Abstract

We show theoretically and empirically that Pay-for-Performance, like many manage-ment fashions, has not achieved its intended aim. Our research focuses on previous empirical studies that examine the relation between variable executive pay and firm performance on various different dates. Our results indicate that a variable ceo income contributes very little to the increase of the firm’s performance, and that ceo salary and firm performance are not linked. The example of Pay-for-Performance shows that in the long run, many management fashions do not solve the problems that they promise to solve.

Suggested Citation

  • Katja Rost & Margit Osterloh, 2009. "Management Fashion Pay-for-Performance for CEOs," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 61(2), pages 119-149, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:sbr:abstra:v:61:y:2009:i:2:p:119-149
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sebastian Goebel & Barbara Weißenberger, 2016. "The Dark Side of Tight Financial Control: Causes and Remedies of Dysfunctional Employee Behaviors," Schmalenbach Business Review, Springer;Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft, vol. 17(1), pages 69-101, April.
    2. repec:wly:econjl:v::y:2017:i:605:p:f236-f265 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Amon Chizema & Xiaohui Liu & Jiangyong Lu & Lan Gao, 2015. "Politically connected boards and top executive pay in Chinese listed firms," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(6), pages 890-906, June.
    4. Pies, Ingo & Sass, Peter, 2010. "Verdienen Manager, was sie verdienen? Eine wirtschaftsethische Stellungnahme," Discussion Papers 2010-4, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    5. Pies Ingo & Sass Peter, 2011. "Wie sollte die Managementvergütung (nicht) reguliert werden? – Ordnungspolitische Überlegungen zur Haftungsbeschränkung von und in Organisationen / How Managerial Compensation Should (not) be Regulate," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 62(1), pages 231-268, January.
    6. Emil Inauen & Margit Osterloh & Bruno Frey & Fabian Homberg, 2015. "How a multiple orientation of control reduces governance failures: a focus on monastic auditing," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 19(4), pages 763-796, November.
    7. Sebastian Goebel & Barbara E. Weißenberger, 2017. "Effects of management control mechanisms: towards a more comprehensive analysis," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 87(2), pages 185-219, February.
    8. Stephan, Gesine & Dütsch, Matthias & Gückelhorn, Cathrin & Struck, Olaf, 2014. "When are bonus payments for managers perceived as fair? Results from a quasi-experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 130-133.
    9. Liu, Xiaohui & Lu, Jiangyong & Chizema, Amon, 2014. "Top executive compensation, regional institutions and Chinese OFDI," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 143-155.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    CEO compensation; Corporate Governance; Crowding Out; Management Fashion; Pay-for-Performance;

    JEL classification:

    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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