IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/toueco/v15y2009i3p653-669.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Revenue Sharing in Community–Private Sector Lodges in Namibia: A Bargaining Model

Author

Listed:
  • Renaud Lapeyre

Abstract

Taking tourism in Namibian rural areas as an empirical case study, this paper analyses the main factors that explain the economic outcome in a negotiation process in which local communities and private operators bargain over the distribution of income generated through a partnership lodge. While much research has focused on the required preconditions (especially property rights) and efficiency effects of tourism partnerships, a Nash bargaining model allows us to assess the distributive effects of such contracts. In particular, variables such as insecure community land tenure, and the resulting reduced value of land, the remoteness of lodges and the community's impatience and attitude towards risk could explain why rural communities have not so far captured the lion's share from tourism activities in communal lands. Finally, the paper shows that future research will be needed to complete the model in order to provide an account of the contractual problems that limit the efficiency of tourism partnerships in rural areas – transaction costs and underinvestment.

Suggested Citation

  • Renaud Lapeyre, 2009. "Revenue Sharing in Community–Private Sector Lodges in Namibia: A Bargaining Model," Tourism Economics, , vol. 15(3), pages 653-669, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:toueco:v:15:y:2009:i:3:p:653-669
    DOI: 10.5367/000000009789036585
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.5367/000000009789036585
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.5367/000000009789036585?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David W. Marcouiller, 1998. "Environmental Resources as Latent Primary Factors of Production in Tourism: The Case of Forest-Based Commercial Recreation," Tourism Economics, , vol. 4(2), pages 131-145, June.
    2. Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
    3. Vail, David & Heldt, Tobias, 2004. "Governing snowmobilers in multiple-use landscapes: Swedish and Maine (USA) cases," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 469-483, April.
    4. Stefanie Engel & Ramón López & Charles Palmer, 2006. "Community–Industry Contracting over Natural Resource use in a Context of Weak Property Rights: The Case of Indonesia," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 33(1), pages 73-93, January.
    5. Vail, David & Hultkrantz, Lars, 2000. "Property rights and sustainable nature tourism: adaptation and mal-adaptation in Dalarna (Sweden) and Maine (USA)," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 223-242, November.
    6. Peter John Massyn, 2007. "Communal land reform and tourism investment in Namibia's communal areas: a question of unfinished business?," Development Southern Africa, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(3), pages 381-392.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. David Marcouiller, 2013. "The rural development attributes of tourism," Chapters, in: Gary Paul Green (ed.), Handbook of Rural Development, chapter 9, pages i-ii, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Vail, David & Heldt, Tobias, 2004. "Governing snowmobilers in multiple-use landscapes: Swedish and Maine (USA) cases," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 469-483, April.
    3. Vedel, Suzanne Elizabeth & Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark & Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl, 2009. "First-movers, non-movers, and social gains from subsidising entry in markets for nature-based recreational goods," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(8-9), pages 2363-2371, June.
    4. Vedel, Suzanne Elizabeth & Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl & Jellesmark Thorsen, Bo, 6. "First Movers, Non Movers and Social Gains from Supporting Entry in Markets for Nature-Based Recreational Goods," Scandinavian Forest Economics: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Scandinavian Society of Forest Economics, Scandinavian Society of Forest Economics, issue 42, April.
    5. Citera, Emanuele & Sau, Lino, 2019. "Complexity, Conventions and Instability: the role of monetary policy," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201924, University of Turin.
    6. Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah & Kobus Muller & Kwame Ameyaw Domfeh, 2018. "‘Complex crisis’ and the rise of collaborative natural resource governance: institutional trajectory of a wildlife governance experience in Ghana," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 20(5), pages 2205-2224, October.
    7. Eicher, Theo S. & Schreiber, Till, 2010. "Structural policies and growth: Time series evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 169-179, January.
    8. Engelhardt, Sebastian v. & Freytag, Andreas, 2013. "Institutions, culture, and open source," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 90-110.
    9. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November.
    10. Elisa D?Adamo, 2018. "La Cost-Benefit Analysis delle grandi infrastrutture: un riesame del Large Hadron Collider (LHC) del CERN," PRISMA Economia - Societ? - Lavoro, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2018(1-2), pages 97-108.
    11. Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta, 2010. "Editors’ Introduction," Chapters, in: Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Osei-Tutu, Francis & Weill, Laurent, 2023. "Individualism reduces borrower discouragement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 370-385.
    13. Nastasi, Federico & Spagano, Salvatore, 2023. "Institutionalist Clues in Celso Furtado’s Economic Thought," MPRA Paper 120242, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Evans, Lewis & Meade, Richard, 2005. "The Role and Significance of Cooperatives in New Zealand Agriculture, A Comparative Institutional Analysis," Working Paper Series 3847, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    15. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    16. Roberto Foa & Anna Nemirovskaya & Elena Mostovova, 2013. "Internal Empires I: Social Institutions of the Frontier," HSE Working papers WP BRP 09/SOC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    17. Aseem Kaul & Jiao Luo, 2018. "An economic case for CSR: The comparative efficiency of for‐profit firms in meeting consumer demand for social goods," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(6), pages 1650-1677, June.
    18. Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2016. "Long-Term Persistence," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(6), pages 1401-1436, December.
    19. Theo S. Eicher & Andreas Leukert, 2009. "Institutions and Economic Performance: Endogeneity and Parameter Heterogeneity," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(1), pages 197-219, February.
    20. Kim, Jongwook & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2008. "A Strategic Theory of the Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Contracts: A Property Rights Approach," Working Papers 08-0108, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:toueco:v:15:y:2009:i:3:p:653-669. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.