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The Failure of Corporate Governance at Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited: Lessons Learnt

Author

Listed:
  • Gagan Kukreja
  • Sanjay Gupta
  • Meena Bhatia

Abstract

This case study investigates multiple issues related to corporate governance, regulations, auditing and financial reporting of Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited (IL&FS). Combinations of these issues resulted in default in payment obligations by IL&FS in August 2018 originated from the agency problem. It posed a substantial systematic risk to the whole financial system of India. This case study highlights the severe drawback of concentration of decision-making and unprofessional work ethics at the senior management level. Further, the case study also provides the opportunity to discuss the inappropriate regulations and governance practices which cause a severe problem in long-standing and prominent organizations like IL&FS. Research Questions: (a) Discuss the vital role of corporate governance in major corporations and the reasons behind governance failures. (b) How did asset–liability mismatch create liquidity problems in a company which deals with long-term projects? (c) How does lack of a proper and unified regulatory framework for Non-Banking Financial Corporation (NBFC) harm investors’ interest? Link to Theory: This case study provides an opportunity to learn the role of corporate governance in NBFC. This case demonstrates the problems arisen because of agency problem and conflict of interest among real-world stakeholders. The case study also highlights the importance of assets–liabilities management in a strategically important organization like IL&FS. Phenomenon Studied: This case study attempts to understand the potential problems that occurred in IL&FS from the failure of good governance, lack of unified regulations for NBFCs and non-adherence of professional responsibilities by the external auditors. Case Context: The case study explores the vital role of the infrastructure development and financing companies in developing economies like India and how it may affect other vital entities of the financial system. Further, it demonstrates how unethical practices at senior management and lack of unified regulations can harm the organization. Findings: The research study found senior management’s potential involvement in unethical practices while managing the company. The financial statements did not reflect the true and fair picture of the entity, which misled investors and other stakeholders. It created chaos in the stock market, resulting in a loss to shareholders. The government set up a new board to restore the confidence of the stock market. Further, the government started to address the problems that arose. Discussions: The case of IL&FS by default, at first glance, looks like a case of asset–liability mismatch due to the lack of supervisory roles of the board and senior management’s massive regulatory failure. It is shocking how under the nose of regulators like Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) a default of this scale could take place. How could IL&FS group grow unchecked into a massive 348 entity. It appeared that regulators, marquee shareholders (banks and institutions), and the board of directors failed in their fiduciary obligation to regulate and supervise IL&FS.

Suggested Citation

  • Gagan Kukreja & Sanjay Gupta & Meena Bhatia, 2021. "The Failure of Corporate Governance at Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited: Lessons Learnt," South Asian Journal of Business and Management Cases, , vol. 10(1), pages 63-76, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:sajbmc:v:10:y:2021:i:1:p:63-76
    DOI: 10.1177/2277977921991897
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 2008. "Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," RAE - Revista de Administração de Empresas, FGV-EAESP Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo (Brazil), vol. 48(2), April.
    2. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    3. Sushma Vishnani & Meena Bhatia, 2019. "Accounting conservatism and corporate governance: evidence from the Indian banking sector," International Journal of Indian Culture and Business Management, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 19(3), pages 303-318.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dr. J. Madegowda, 2025. "Restoring Trust: Ethics, Scandals, and the Reform of Financial Reporting Practices," African Journal of Commercial Studies, African Journal of Commercial Studies, vol. 6(5).

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