Relative Efficiency of AD Valorem and Unit Taxes: The Case of Endogenous Quality
This article studies the relative efficiency of unit and ad valorem taxes in a competitive market in which the quality of product is endogenous. The author finds that the relative efficiency of these two taxes depends on exactly how individuals value the quality of a product. Specifically, the unit tax welfare dominates the ad valorem tax in the “casket” case and the “full-price” case, whereas the ad valorem tax welfare dominates the unit tax in the “lightbulb” case.
Volume (Year): 31 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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