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Redistribution To the Poor: an Overheard Conversation

Author

Listed:
  • Robert D. Plotnick

    (University of Washington)

Abstract

Why do we distribute income to the poor through government programs? Spokespersons for the median voter/interdependent preferences and interest group approaches to public policy determination present simple competing models. Their listener observes that the two models, based on quite different premises about voter preferences and how collective choices are made, yield identical testable implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert D. Plotnick, 1986. "Redistribution To the Poor: an Overheard Conversation," Public Finance Review, , vol. 14(2), pages 223-228, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:14:y:1986:i:2:p:223-228
    DOI: 10.1177/109114218601400207
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. Orr, Larry L, 1976. "Income Transfers as a Public Good: An Application to AFDC," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(3), pages 359-371, June.
    3. Varian, Hal R., 1980. "Redistributive taxation as social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-68, August.
    4. Hochman, Harold M & Rodgers, James D, 1969. "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 542-557, Part I Se.
    5. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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